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ABSTRACT- Orchestrated collaborative effort of physical and cyber 
components to satisfy given requirements is the central concept behind 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). To duly ensure the performance of 
components, a software-based resilience manager is a flexible choice to 
detect and recover from faults quickly. However, a single resilience manager, 
placed at the centre of the system to deal with every fault, suffers from 
decision-making overburden; and therefore, is out of the question for 
distributed large-scale CPS. On the other hand, prompt detection of failures 
and efficient recovery from them are challenging for decentralised resilience 
managers. In this regard, we present a novel resilience management 
framework that utilises the concept of management hierarchy. System 
design contracts play a key role in this framework for prompt fault-detection 
and recovery. Besides the details of the framework, an Industry 4.0 related 
test case is presented in this article to provide further insights. 
KEYWORDS- D.2.4.g Reliability < D.2.4 Software/Program Verification < D.2 
Software Engineering < D Software/Software Engineering, D.2.15 Software 
and System Safety < D.2 Software Engineering < D Software/Software 
Engineering, D.2.4.f Programming by contract < D.2.4 Software/Program 
Verification < D.2 Software Engineering < D Software/Software Engineering 
 
INTRODUCTION - Modern cyber-physical systems satisfy user requirements through a 
synergistic interaction between cyber and physical components. To maintain this synergy, the 
performance of components is not only important but also mandatory. However, large-scale CPS, 
such as Industry 4.0 based manufacturing plants, are massively distributed. In such systems, 
ensuring every component’s functional and non-functional correctness is challenging. 
When a cyber or physical component fails according to requirements, a fault is generated. 
Depending on the source, faults can be broadly categorised into five categories. When system 
measurements are corrupted; causing a deviation between actual and sensed variables; the 
generated fault is a sensor fault [1]. Actuator fault represents discrepancy between the commanded 
and actual input to the system [1]. Process or component faults are failures of the system 
components, leading to changes in the system dynamics [1]. These include faults in both cyber as 
well as physical components and consider functional and non-functional requirements. When the 
communication channel among components fails to meet requirements (e.g., message deadlines), a 
communication fault is generated [2]. Environment fault occurs when something from the 
environment, but not a component of the CPS, causes a fault (e.g., particle strike). 
A resilience management strategy is required to detect and recover from any fault. A primitive but 
widely used strategy is redundancy (e.g., hardware redundancy [3]). However, redundancy imposes 
considerable and unnecessary computational, spatial and energy burden [4]. Moreover, in 
massively distributed CPS, component redundancy introduces communication and synchronization 
overheads. 
In contrast to redundancy, self-adaptive software-based resilience management approaches are 
more flexible and space-energy efficient [4-8]. Such approaches provide on-demand resilience 
services by assessing the status of the components and adapting them to meet requirements. 
However, some of these existing software-based approaches utilise a centralised architecture [4, 8]. 
In such architectures, components are connected to a central resilience management software 
(referred hereafter as “Resilience Manager” (RM)). Therefore, the RM’s decision-making process 
slows down with an increase in the number of components. Moreover, a single RM has the risk of 
single-point failure. Due to this reason, in large-scale CPS, decentralised resilience management 
techniques are desirable. 
A fully decentralised resilience framework requires fast collection of fault information and 
synchronization of decisions for quick detection and recovery. However, this is generally 
impractical in large-scale CPS, and hence existing decentralised approaches such as RIAPS [5] and 
iLand [6] attempt recovery without complete fault information. For example, the discovery service 
application in RIAPS does not consider the expected recovery time to a fault which incurs 
unnecessary communication overheads and delays [7]. Similarly, the reconfiguration manager in 
iLand is unaware of fault types and their recovery times which incurs unnecessary reconfigurations. 
Thus, a resilience management framework that is scalable and detects and recovers from faults 
robustly is highly desirable. To this end, we propose and demonstrate hierarchical resilience 
management with contract-based fault detection framework in this paper. The hierarchy provides 
scalability, while formal contracts ensure robust and quick fault detection. Furthermore, RMs 
communicate information about the faults to enable more meaningful fault-recovery. We 
introduced the use of contracts for fault detection in [7], but that proposal neither includes a 
hierarchical framework nor does it consider the use of contracts with parameters; as discussed in 
the following sections these features are vital for scalability and efficient fault-recovery. Hierarchy 
allows decomposition of the resilience management functions, aiding scalability. Whereas, 
parametric contracts enable efficient runtime updates to the hierarchy so that system degradation 
techniques can be used for fault-recovery (e.g., reducing the speed of a conveyor belt when a robot 
is unable to pick up from the belt). 
Section 1. Hierarchical Resilience Management Framework 
In this section, we present our new resilience management framework that utilises the concept of a 
management hierarchy. In this hierarchy, each manager makes use of parameterised system design 
contracts [9] to reduce communication overheads and execution time, while still maintaining 
scalability. 
Overview 
In this framework, resilience management is the collaborative responsibility of a group of RMs. 
Each manager may have associated contracts that are used by observers to monitor the system for 
faults. A manager makes resilience decisions based on the information from its contracts as well as 
other managers. These managers follow a communication protocol that dictates to whom and what 
to talk about. Due to this protocol, a virtual management hierarchy of RMs and their associated 
contracts are created. 
As shown in Figure 1, each RM in the leaf level is responsible for a cyber or physical component. 
It has observers which monitor whether the associated component satisfies its contracts. When a 
fault is detected in the component (contract failure), the manager first tries to recover locally. If no 
local solution exists, the manager informs its “parent RM.” It may also provide fault information 
such as the extent of failure (e.g., amount of contract violation), and may receive updated parameter 
values for the contracts from its parent. If no parameter updates are received, it implies that the 
fault has been successfully handled at a higher-level in the hierarchy without any system 
degradation. 
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Figure 1 OVERVIEW OF THE FRAMEWORK 
A non-leaf level RM, on the other hand, monitors whether multiple components duly collaborate 
to meet requirements. It receives fault information from lower-level managers and tries to recover 
locally. If the solution requires system degradation, new parameter values are generated and 
communicated to all the lower-level managers. If local recovery is not feasible, then fault 
information is further propagated upwards until the root level manager. If the root also fails to find 
a feasible solution, then it hands over responsibility to “system control,” which is a decision logic 
outside the scope of the proposed framework (e.g., a human operator or resilient controller module). 
Framework Details 
The resilience framework is based on contracts for system design [9]. Such a contract is a precise 
description of (i) inputs and outputs of a component or subsystem, (ii) assumptions on the inputs 
and environment, and (iii) required guarantees about the outputs or behaviour of the component or 
subsystem. Our framework uses a variant of the system design contract, called “parametric 
contracts” [10], that allow parameterised specification of assumptions and guarantees so that these 
can be updated at runtime simply by changing the parameter values. 
A set of contracts is assigned to a RM in our framework. For a given contract, runtime observers 
check whether the expected behaviour is generated by the component or subsystem of concern. 
Observers can be expressed using different formalisms like finite state machines and timed and 
hybrid automata [7]. Upon failure of a contract, a fault is triggered, and the manager performs an 
analysis to determine whether any solutions within its scope can be applied. This analysis could 
depend on the current number and extent of contract failures. If the chosen solution requires a 
parameter update, then the observer is informed accordingly. If no solution is found, the manager 
informs the higher-level RM, providing information about the fault. The higher-level manager, in 
turn, uses failure information from its own contracts as well as from lower-level managers to 
perform further fault-recovery. If the chosen recovery procedure at any level necessitates an update 
to contract parameters, the update is communicated to all the lower-level managers. Thus, 
throughout the process, only fault information and parameter values are exchanged between RMs. 
User provided end-to-end requirements and component capabilities are used to generate the 
contracts. The component capabilities are first used to define leaf level contracts. For example, 
contracts for a controller component could be derived from information about the host hardware 
and available alternate controller behaviours. Contracts from different components in a subsystem 
could then be composed to derive higher-level contracts in the hierarchy. Contract parameters can 
be derived based on tuneable performance knobs available in the system. For example, in 
manufacturing plants, the speed of conveyor belts can be used as a contract parameter to degrade 
the plant’s throughput. Functions based on these parameters could then be used in assumptions and 
guarantees of contracts. Although contract assumptions and guarantees could be defined using any 
desired logic, we restrict our focus to Boolean logic so that efficient observers can be implemented.  
When contracts are composed, care must be taken to ensure that the resulting hierarchy satisfies 
desirable properties for contract composition and refinement (defined in [9] and reproduced below). 
In particular, for this framework, we aim to ensure that the composition of a set of contracts 
belonging to some lower-level components/subsystems, is a refinement of the contract in the higher-
level parent subsystem. Additionally, it is also important to ensure that the root level contract 
satisfies (is a refinement of) user provided end-to-end requirements. 
Refinement of contracts: A contract C’ is a refinement of contract C when the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
1) Assumptions of C’ are the weaker set of assumptions of C 
2) Guarantees of C are the weaker set of guarantees of C’ 
Composition of contracts: Contracts C1 and C2 can be composed as C1⊗C2 when the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
1) If the guarantees of one component (C1/2) are independent of the assumptions of the other, 
then the assumptions of C1⊗C2 are the stronger of the assumptions of C1 and C2 
2) If they are not independent, then the assumptions of C1⊗C2 are the weakest assumptions 
such that when they are conjuncted with the guarantees of C1 (likewise C2), the assumptions 
of C2 (likewise C1) are implied 
3) Guarantees of C1⊗C2 are the conjunction of the guarantees of C1 and C2 
Note, outputs of one component that are inputs of the other are omitted from C1⊗C2. Such a 
composition of contracts is useful when composing lower-level component contracts that form a 
cause-effect chain into a higher-level subsystem contract.  
In Section 2, using a case study, we illustrate the process of contract generation and use them for 
providing resilience. Note, techniques for automatic generation of the contract hierarchy are out of 
the scope of this article and will be addressed in future work. 
Communication protocol between Resilience Managers: Communication between a parent and 
child RM is similar to a client-server communication model. Client (child RM) initiates a request 
to a server (parent RM). The request contains fault information. The server responds by suggesting 
updates to contract parameters. In cases when the fault is handled without any performance 
degradation, the server may not provide any response. In cases when a “sibling client” issues a 
request, it is also possible to receive a response from the server without any self-initiated request. 
Advantages and Limitations of the Framework 
Only fault information and contract parameter values are exchanged by the RMs in our framework. 
Contract specifications do not change. Moreover, as soon as a solution is found within the hierarchy, 
the recovery process stops. As a result, communication overhead is reduced significantly when 
compared to existing fully centralised and decentralised architectures. Further, the hierarchical 
approach is also robust against single-point failures. 
One of the challenges of the proposed framework is the design of the hierarchy. An efficient design 
would require information about component capabilities as well as how the components are 
combined to form subsystems. A key limitation is the inability to integrate stochastic approaches 
for fault detection. Both these issues will be addressed in future work. 
Section 2. Case Study 
To evaluate the performance of our resilience framework, we implemented a testbed on a 
Fischertechnik Model (EAN-Code 4048962250404). The testbed can generate some fault scenarios 
observed in Industry 4.0 environment. In the following subsections, we present details about the 
testbed, the fault scenarios, the contract hierarchy monitored by our resilience framework and 
performance comparison of different resilience frameworks. 
Case Study Description 
Figure 2 presents a bird’s eye view of the testbed. As shown, this model has two Light Sensors 
(LS1, LS2), a Colour Processor (CP), a conveyer belt, three ejectors and three bins to collect tokens. 
It also comes with a Motor Controller (MC) to control the speed of the motor that rotates the 
conveyor belt. Moreover, a Pulse Counter (PC) is present to count the number of steps that passed 
through LS1. 
 
Figure 2 FISCHERTECHNIK TRAINING MODEL (EAN-CODE 4048962250404) 
Figure 3 presents the operation flow of the training model. When a token is placed on the belt at 
LS1, the sensor detects the presence of the token and activates CP. When the token passes through 
CP, the colour sensor detects the token’s colour. A decision-making component; Bin Selector (BS), 
then calculates the step count at which the token reaches either the first, second or third ejector. In 
this calculation, the step number at which the CP was activated is used. The calculation result is 
sent to the Ejector Controller (EC). Moreover, depending on the colour of the token, the BS dictates 
the EC with regards to which ejector must be activated. The appropriate ejector activates as soon 
as the calculated step count is reached. In our implementation, we only use the first 2 bins and white 
tokens. Under normal operation, the white token would be ejected into the first bin. In case of a 
fault that requires changes to the conveyor belt speed, the second bin is used temporarily until 
fault-recovery is completed.  
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Figure 3 FISCHERTECHNIK TRAINING MODEL REGULAR OPERATION FLOW 
Logic Control Implementation 
As shown in Figure 3, instead of traditional PLCs, we introduced four Raspberry Pi 3 (RPI) to hold 
the control logic of CP, BS, EC, and MC. An RPI comes with 1.20GHz Quad Core Processor, 1GB 
RAM, and multiple General Purpose Input/Output pins. Each RPI runs Raspbian GNU/Linux 8.0 
operating system (kernel version 4.9.35-v7). An Arduino Pro Mini microcontroller is also used to 
provide analogue to digital conversion of the colour sensor output for the RPI. In addition, due to 
the voltage differences between the RPIs and the testbed, voltage converters are used to interface 
them together. All the RPIs are interconnected over Ethernet through a network switch.   
Resilience Framework Implementation 
To introduce resilience management and fault injection capability on the testbed, we used FORTE, 
a runtime environment integrated with 4DIAC IDE [11], on the RPI. 4DIAC is based on the IEC 
61499 standard, an event-driven function block model for distributed control systems. Our 
resilience framework, including observers for contracts and RMs, is built on top of 4DIAC.  
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Figure 4 ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN OF THE RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
Our resilience framework comprises of a three-level management hierarchy. There are three Leaf 
Level (Lf) RMs, one Level 1 (L1) RM and one Level 2 (L2) RM. The first Lf uses a parameterised 
latency-related contract for CP and the second one uses a similar contract for BS (both correspond 
to a process fault scenario). The third Lf on EC uses a contract that deals with the jitter of the token 
on the conveyor belt (corresponds to a physical fault scenario). L1 handles the contract for Latency 
Management (LM) composed from the contracts of CP and BS. Finally, L2 uses the root level 
contract composed of the contracts of L1 and Lf on EC. Leaf RMs reside on the RPIs corresponding 
to their respective components (CP, BS, and EC). L1 resides on the RPI corresponding to BS, and 
L2 resides on the RPI corresponding to MC because it controls the speed of the conveyor belt for 
fault-recovery. 
Motor speed of the conveyor belt (MS) is the only parameter used by all the contracts in the 
hierarchy except for the one on EC. This is reasonable because, given MS and the step count from 
PC, precise time durations for the token to reach specific sensors or components (e.g., LS2, CP) can 
be computed. 
Contract and Resilience Manager Generation 
The contracts were manually generated based on user provided requirements and the capabilities 
of the components used. The end goal of the user is to ensure that the tokens are correctly ejected 
in the bins. For contract generation, we follow a bottom-up approach where we first identify the 
leaf components which would represent the lowest level of monitoring that can be done. Each 
component may have one or more contracts and corresponding observers associated with it. We 
then compose such leaf contracts into higher-level contracts to form the hierarchy. As described 
above, we identified three leaf contracts (corresponding to CP, BS, and EC), one L1 contract which 
is composed of the contracts for CP and BS, and a L2 contract which is composed of the contracts 
for L1 and EC. Each contract except the one on EC uses MS as a parameter. We now present the 
contract and resilience hierarchy details. Please refer to Figure 3 for information on the variables 
used by these contracts. 
A parametric contract named CCP is used by the Lf RM of CP and is defined as follows.  
CONTRACT NAME: CCP  
• INPUTS --- LS1 
• OUTPUTS --- SCCP; CVCP 
• PARAMETERS --- MS 
• ASSUMPTIONS --- (MS==S1) ∨ (MS==S2) ∨ (MS==S3) 
• GUARANTEE --- ↑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1 ⟹ (SCCP!=0) ∧  (CVCP!=null) within 𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(Ms) 
Contract CCP encodes the following information. It takes one input: light sensor trigger (↑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1). For 
any allowed MS value (one of three), component CP should generate a step count (SCCP) and an 
enumerated token colour value (CVCP) within 𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(Ms) seconds. SCCP is the step number at which 
the CP was activated. When CVCP is ‘W’, it indicates a white token; ‘N’ indicates a non-white token 
and null means it has not been initialised. 
Contract CBS is used by the Lf RM of BS which takes two inputs: SCCP and CVCP generated by 
component CP. After receiving the inputs, component BS should generate two outputs within 
𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(Ms) seconds: (i) ejector number to activate (EBS) and (ii) step number at which the ejector 
should be activated (SCBS). In our case th,is is the ejector for the first bin (normal operation).  
CONTRACT NAME: CBS  
• INPUTS --- SCCP; CVCP. 
• OUTPUTS --- EBS; SCBS 
• PARAMETERS --- MS 
• ASSUMPTIONS --- (MS==S1) ∨ (MS==S2) ∨ (MS==S3) 
• GUARANTEE --- (CVCP!=null) ∧ (SCCP != 0)⟹(SCBS!=0) ∧ (EBS!=null) within 
𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(Ms) 
The observers for contracts CCP and CBS are monitoring the respective guarantees and also record 
the actual component execution latencies (CL). The corresponding Lf RMs have no fault-recovery 
mechanisms. When a contract fails, the RM directly reports the fault to L1 RM together with 
information about the actual latency CL of the component.  
The L1 RM for Latency Management (LM) is responsible for the contract CLM defined below. It 
checks whether the guarantees of both contracts CCP and CBS are satisfied. This contract is generated 
using the contract composition technique described in Section 1. Further, to allow for dynamic 
slack management between CP and BS, contract refinement is used so that 𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(Ms) + 𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(Ms) <
𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(Ms). The difference between these two values is the latency slack available within L1. If the 
reported actual latencies from lower-level RMs (CL) are within this slack, then no further action is 
taken by L1. Otherwise, it reports the fault to L2 RM together with the amount of latency violation. 
This clearly shows the benefit of having contract hierarchy as latency can be dynamically 
distributed at runtime between CP and BS. Note, no observer is required for this contract because 
all the information is provided by lower-level RMs. 
CONTRACT NAME: CLM – Composition and refinement of CCP and CBS 
• INPUTS --- LS1 
• OUTPUTS --- EBS; SCBS 
• PARAMETERS --- MS 
• ASSUMPTIONS --- (MS==S1) ∨ (MS==S2) ∨ (MS==S3) 
• GUARANTEE --- ↑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1 ⟹(SCBS!=0) ∧ (EBS!=null) within 𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(Ms) 
A key design choice in the development of contracts CCP, CBS and CLM is the determination of 
various functions that map MS to latency values. In general, these functions for CCP and CBS should 
be such that they encode “typical” execution latencies for the components CP and BS, respectively. 
Whereas for CLM, the function should encode a time duration that is minimally the total typical 
execution latencies of CP and BS together, but no more than the time taken by the token to reach 
LS2. 
Contract CEC is used by the Lf RM of EC, which checks for jitter of the tokens on the conveyor belt. 
It takes three inputs: (i) current step count SC, (ii) SCCP and (iii) the signal from LS2. This contract 
checks if the rising edge of LS2 coincides with the step count at SCCP+Offset, where Offset is the 
number of steps on the belt between CP and LS2. 
CONTRACT NAME: CEC   
• INPUTS --- SC; SCCP; LS2. 
• OUTPUTS --- None 
• PARAMETERS --- None 
• ASSUMPTIONS --- True 
• GUARANTEE --- ↑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2 ⟺(SC==SCCP+Offset) 
The observer for CEC monitors its guarantee and reports any failure to the Lf RM of EC. This RM 
first reports the failure to L2 and then activates the ejector for the second bin at the appropriate step 
count (temporary bin to collect tokens while fault-recovery is ongoing). The appropriate step count 
is determined once the LS2 trigger is eventually received. 
Finally, the root level contract CMC is used by the L2 RM of MC. CMC is the composition of contracts 
CLM and CEC. The guarantee of this contract aims to ensure that all the tokens seen by LS1 are 
successfully allocated a bin before the token reaches LS2 and that the token indeed reaches LS2 at 
the appropriate step count. Since LS2 is the last sensor before the bins, this is the most reasonable 
monitoring that one could do to ensure user requirement satisfaction. 
CONTRACT NAME: CMC 
• INPUTS --- SC; SCCP; LS1; LS2  
• OUTPUTS --- EBS; SCBS 
• PARAMETERS --- MS 
• ASSUMPTIONS --- (MS==S1) ∨ (MS==S2) ∨ (MS==S3) 
• GUARANTEE --- [↑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1 ⟹(SCBS!=0) ∧ (EBS!=null) within 𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(Ms)] ∧ 
[↑ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2 ⟺(SC==SCCP+Offset) 
L2 finally combines information from all the contracts as well as lower-level RMs to decide whether 
to reduce MS and hence degrade system performance. It first uses a bin sensor (B1/2) to check 
whether the token was inserted into the correct bin (EBS) irrespective of any reported faults. This 
may happen for instance when component BS is able to activate the ejector on time despite the 
latency violation of L1 (there is still some time between the LS2 trigger and the token reaching the 
first bin). Although unlikely, it may also happen when a positive jitter before the LS2 trigger is 
accurately compensated by a negative jitter after the trigger and before the first bin. If not, and a 
fault is reported by Lf of EC, then the motor speed is reduced to its slowest value of S3 to eliminate 
this unpredictable jitter. Finally, if none of the above are true and a fault is reported by L1, then the 
motor speed is reduced to either S2 or S3 depending on the amount of latency violation. 
Thus, the hierarchical framework can progressively escalate faults until it eventually results in a 
system degradation. At each level, it attempts fault-recovery before escalation to minimise the 
impact on the system. 
Fault Scenarios 
Faults can be injected manually into the testbed through the RPIs and the 4DIAC function blocks 
of components to create the following scenario types: 
1. For component CP, CL>𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(Ms), but CL+𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵(Ms) ≤  𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(Ms). That is, CP’s Lf RM 
reports a fault, but L1 RM has sufficient slack. 
2. Same as above for component BS. 
3. Same as above for both components CP and BS. That is, both the Lf RMs report faults, 
but L1 RM still has sufficient slack. 
4. L1 RM reports a fault to L2 RM. 
5. EC’s Lf RM reports a fault to L2 RM. 
6. Both EC’s Lf RM and L1 RM report faults to L2 RM.  
Performance Evaluation 
Our experimental setup aims to compare the time and amount of communication required for fault-
recovery in our resilience framework compared with representative (hypothetical) designs of fully 
centralised and fully decentralised resilience frameworks. Such frameworks do not have the 
concept of a management hierarchy.  
In a fully centralised framework, any faults that occur in a component would be sent to a centralised 
manager which then responds accordingly. For the case study considered in this article, there would 
be three components (CP, BS, EC) and one centralised RM on the MC, requiring one message for 
fault reporting and three messages for a response (one to each component) for each fault.  
A fully decentralised framework would have four components (CP, BS, EC, MC) with their RMs 
communicating with one another. A fault occurrence would require each RM to reach consensus 
before fault-recovery can happen. We assume the best design to reach consensus requires three 
message sets: (i) fault reporting, (ii) response with possible solutions and (iii) chosen solution. That 
is, nine messages in all for each fault in our test case. For both the centralised and decentralised 
frameworks, we assume that the components have the capability to detect local faults. This is to 
ensure that the comparison is fair. 
We ran an experiment on our testbed that involved the injection of nine fault scenarios, where 
scenario types 1,2 and 3 occurred twice and types 4, 5 and 6 occurred once. This implies a total of 
12 faults during the run because scenario types 3 and 6 generate two faults each. The number of 
messages generated by our framework during this run is 21. Whereas, for the fully centralised and 
decentralised frameworks this would result in 4*12=48 and 9*12=108 messages, respectively. This 
translates to communication savings of 56% and 81% when compared to the two architectures. 
We now compare the time spent for fault-recovery. Measurements from our testbed indicate that 
the message latency is 1ms and decision-making is 0.5ms on an average. For the centralised and 
decentralised frameworks, each fault would require one and two decision-making steps respectively. 
For our framework, scenario types 1, 2, 3 and 5 require one decision-making step (either at L1 or 
L2), while types 4 and 6 require two steps (both at L1 and L2). Thus, the time spent in fault-recovery 
is 27.5ms, 54ms, and 114.5ms for our, the centralised and the decentralised frameworks, 
respectively. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we present a first-of-its-kind resilience management framework that utilises the 
concept of management hierarchy and parametric contracts to reduce communication overhead and 
time for fault-recovery, while avoiding any single point failures. Experimental results reveal that 
this framework exchanges 56% and 81% fewer messages during fault-recovery compared to the 
fully centralised and decentralised architectures, respectively. Moreover, the hierarchical 
architecture makes it suitable for large-scale, Industry 4.0 like cyber-physical systems. Readers can 
watch the video in [12] to see how our resilience framework works for the fault scenarios discussed 
in this article. 
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